CSCW systems provide computer support to facilitate cooperation between users. This paper proposes an approach to the formal speci cation of security requirements for CSCW applications, where a CSCW application is viewed as a collection of activities that users may participate in. The speci cation approach is straightforward, and can be used to capture a wide variety of security requirements, including integrity and con dentiality. It is illustrated with a case study of a secure electronic examinations system.
Introduction
The purpose of Computer Supported Collaborative Working (CSCW) is to provide computer support that facilitates collaboration and cooperation between users. This support may be as simple as the provision of electronic mail facilities, giving users the freedom to cooperate in an unstructured manner. It may be as sophisticated as some of the applications in concurrent engineering which exercise a high degree of control over the actions of the participants in an engineering design activity. An example is reported by Bowen and Bahler 1] ; the system they describe mediates con icts between user's contributions towards an overall design. CSCW support may be across a single computer environment, or more typically, across networks of heterogeneous systems.
Research in CSCW and groupware evolved from work on Decision Support Systems 9] . A great deal of work has been done on the technological aspects of CSCW: the problems of how one actually provides computer support for cooperation. Introductions to the subject may be found in the literature 17, 18] .
In this paper we are interested in what is meant by security in CSCW applications. To do this, we require a clear and formal de nition of what is meant by a CSCW application and the support that we would expect the CSCW system to provide. We are not concerned with, at least at this stage, the technological aspects of how security should be enforced. But we are concerned with how one might specify the security requirements for a CSCW application and the resulting properties that a CSCW system, providing support for the application, should uphold. While integrity security requirements can be characterized as safety or functionality properties, information ow based security requirements are described in terms of (harder to reason about) con dentiality properties 13]. Our proposed speci cation approach can be used to capture both types of requirement.
A simple case study motivates our proposal of what characterizes a CSCW system, and the security properties that it should maintain. The case study is a secure electronic examination system, where the users (professors, lecturers and students) cooperate in the setting, taking and grading of examinations. The case study contains many security requirements. For example, integrity requirements such as, only lecturers appointed as setters of an exam paper may write an exam paper, and con dentiality requirements such as, a student may not learn or deduce anything about the contents of an exam paper until it has been released. The security requirements for this case study are expressible, in a natural way, using our speci cation approach. To our surprise, all of the con dentiality requirements were expressible, using the same information-ow property. This is one of our main conclusions.
A CSCW application may be viewed as a collection of activities that users may participate in. Section 2 describes how users may join, leave and participate in, an activity during its lifetime. Our perspective of CSCW applications, while abstract, does appear to conform to the criteria given by Reinhard et al. 21 ] to identify CSCW systems. Based on this perspective, Section 3 investigates how we might formally specify functionality properties for CSCW activities. This gives rise to a number of safety properties that a CSCW system, supporting the activity, should uphold. Our approach is illustrated in Section 4 by the formal speci cation of the activities of a Secure Electronic Examinations (SEE) system.
Much of the SEE case study is an example of integrity and access-control style security speci cations. These safety-property based requirements specify controls over whether, and how, users may participate in activities. Section 5 investigates how we might specify con dentiality properties for a CSCW system. The essence of our de nition of con dentiality is that information may not ow from the participants in an activity to the non-participants, during the lifetime of the activity. Given this de nition, we show how the con dentiality requirements for the SEE system can be expressed. We also provide an unwinding theorem which de nes con dentiality in terms of states and state transitions.
In Section 6 we leave our main case study for a brief look at some others. A glossary of the mathematical notation used is given in Appendix B.
Computer Supported Collaborative Working
We view a collaboration as some agreed activity that a number of di erent users may participate in. A CSCW system is a system that provides support for these activities, ensuring that user participation in activities is in accordance to the requirements of the individual activities. In this section we propose an approach to organizing the description of the requirements of an activity.
Example 1 In a university, a number of people may be involved in the setting of an examination paper. Initially, the chair for the subject concerned is responsible for appointing sta to set the paper. Once appointed, a member of sta may set all or part of a paper; this typically involves devising a series of suitable questions for the exam paper. The chair also appoints checkers for examination papers. Checkers are members of sta who are responsible for checking the content/quality of an exam paper. An exam paper may be released to students only if it is deemed suitable by the checker(s). If it is considered unsuitable, then it must be re-set by the setter(s) and re-checked by the checker(s).
This cooperation required between chair, and sta on the development of an exam paper can be viewed as an activity. A CSCW system should provide support for this activity by ensuring that the requirements are upheld, for example, a requirement such as: only appointed sta may participate in the setting of a paper.
Let the set USER represent the set of all possible users. Let the set EVENT represent the set of all events that users may engage in, that is, the set of all possible interactions between the system and its environment (users).
We propose to characterize an individual CSCW activity by the following components.
join; leave : PEVENT. These de ne the sets of possible events that a user may engage to join and leave the activity, respectively. Note that P EVENT is the the powerset of EVENT. do : P EVENT. Once a user is a member of the activity, she participates in the activity by engaging events from the set do. obo : EVENT $ USER (`on behalf of'). Event e is engaged on behalf of user u for this activity if e obo u holds. If e obo u holds, the actual user may engage the event or the event may be engaged by a di erent user on behalf of user u. Note that, since obo is de ned to be a relation, then it is possible for one user to engage an event on behalf of a number of other users. start; nish : PEVENT. Users may participate in an activity only during the activity's lifetime. The activity must start with an event from start. An event from nish is necessary to terminate the activity.
conclude : P(seq 1 EVENT). De nes the sequences of activity events, that may lead to a successful conclusion of the activity. Note that (seq 1 EVENT) is the set of all possible non-empty sequences of events from EVENT. This characterization forms the basis for the speci cation of functional requirements of activities. Section 3 will give a formal interpretation for this view of an activity.
Example 2 Consider a simpli cation of the set paper activity (Example 1), where there is just one exam paper to be set and the university has just one chair and one lecturer. A more realistic version of this activity will be considered in Section 4.
The chair appoints the lecturer as the setter of the exam paper by engaging event appoint-setter. When this event is engaged (by the chair) the lecturer becomes a member of the activity.
join = fappoint-setterg
We regard the chair as the initiator of the activity, rather than a participant of the activity. The lecturer may at any stage opt out of participation in the activity by resigning. leave = fresign-setterg Relation obo must be appropriately de ned to re ect the fact that while the lecturer may engage event resign-setter on behalf of herself (resign-setter obo lecturer), the chair engages the event appoint-setter on behalf of the lecturer (appoint-setter obo lecturer). Once joined, the lecturer may set the paper using an event of the form write:c, where c : TEXT gives the questions etc., of the paper. Revisions are made by writing further versions of the paper. Participation in the activity may start once it is announced that the paper must be set (start = fannounceg). The activity is nished when the paper (with its contents) is released to students. nish = release : TEXT If the paper has not yet been written then it is inappropriate to release the paper, and the activity should not be considered nished. The set conclude is used to de ne when the activity may successfully conclude, that is, the sequences of events that may lead to a successful termination. An exam paper may not be released if it has not yet been written. Thus the set paper activity may terminate with a release:c if it is preceded by a write:c. conclude = fc : TEXT hwrite:c; release:cig The set notation de nes the set of all sequences of the form hwrite:c; release:ci, for c 2 TEXT. Concluding sequences are drawn from events in join, leave and do. Implicit in our de nition of an activity is a requirement that the lecturer participating in the activity (engaging a write:c event) is a member of the activity at that point. Thus, an activity having engaged in events happoint-setter; write:c; write:a; resign-setter; release:ai is considered to have concluded since it contains the concluding sequence hwrite:a; release:ai. Events not in join, leave and do are ignored: we have found that this leads to simpler conclude speci cations. There are a number of similar requirements implicit with our characterization of CSCW activities; these will be considered in the next section.
3 Specifying CSCW activities
In 10] a trace-based speci cation for a system is given as a predicate p(t), which must hold for all possible traces t of the system (for the system to meet the speci cation). Such trace based speci cations may be used to describe safety properties for a system.
In this paper we are concerned with the speci cation of a certain class of systems|those that are expected to manage a collection of CSCW activities. In Section 2 we described how activities can be viewed in terms of users joining, leaving, participating, etc. This perspective provides us with a basic idiom or template for specifying CSCW activities: it gives us a guideline on the way an activity can be organized for speci cation Implicit in this approach to organizing and specifying an activity is a requirement that the components of the template are well-de ned, that is, correctly speci ed. For example, the last event in a conclude trace should be an event from the set nish. Section 3.1 gives properties that an activity, described using our template, should possess to be correctly speci ed. Given a correctly speci ed activity, Section 3.2 de nes (safety) properties that a system supporting the activity is expected to possess. To aid the reader, we typeset the names of these properties in a typewriter font. Names ending in REQ correspond to requirements for correct speci cation, while names ending in SPEC correspond to the safety properties that a CSCW system is expected to uphold.
Correct speci cation of activities
If an activity is de ned using the template above (in terms of variables join,leave, and do, etc.) then for consistency, every user who can participate (do) in the activity must be capable of being a member of the activity. The users who can participate in the activity are those for whom events from do may be engaged on behalf of, that is, the set obo(jjoinj ). The notation obo(jjoinj ) is the relational image of join through obo. It is de ned as the set of users u 2 USER to which obo relates some member of join. These users must be able to join and leave the activity. Thus we must have MemberDoREQ = obo(jdoj ) obo(jjoinj ) \ obo(jleavej ) We also require that the relation obo associates users for all events in do, i.e., do dom obo. Other events that may be engaged by, or on behalf of, participants are join and leave. However 
Properties of activities
Given a correctly speci ed activity (based on our template and satisfying requirement TemplateREQ), we must specify the properties that a system supporting the activity is expected to possess. These properties are expressed as a predicate p(t) over a trace variable t. For the system to maintain the property, p(t) must be true for all possible traces t of the system. In the following discussion, the properties we specify will be in terms of trace t, with respect to a particular activity described in terms of variables join, leave, start, nish, conclude and obo.
Users may join and leave an activity any number of times. Given a system that has engaged a sequence of events denoted by trace t, then user u is currently a member of the activity if there is one more join event than leave event engaged on behalf of u (for this activity).
Member(u) = #(t j fj : join j j obo ug) = #(t j fl : leave j l obo ug) + 1
NotMember(u) = #(t j fj : join j j obo ug) = #(t j fl : leave j l obo ug)
At any moment, every user must be either a member or not a member of the activity.
The activity is considered to have started once an event from start has been engaged. Note that the activity may be restarted at any time by the further engaging of start events. Given that P v=v 0 ] denotes the predicate P with all occurances of free variable v replaced by v 0 , then de ne
The activity has successfully nished if a nish event has been engaged and the sequence of events that lead to the nish is a valid conclusion. Thus, the safety properties that must be upheld by a system providing support for an activity speci ed using the template described in Section 2 is that for all possible traces t of the system then ActivitySPEC This syntax has the obvious interpretation: it de nes a speci cation (on a free variable t) called hNamei which has property ActivitySPEC over variables start, nish, etc. The syntax is used to associate values with these variables for a particular activity. The optional entry hvarsi is used to introduce any additional free variables used in the speci cation. The speci cation is wellde ned if it satis es TemplateREQ. Outside the syntactic structure, the variable names start, nish, etc., are considered out of scope, but may be referred to using the conventional`dot' notation, for example hNamei:start. It is straightforward to prove that this speci cation is well-de ned, in the sense that TemplateREQ holds. The relation obo is speci ed as a set of pairs, with the usual interpretation that (x; y) 2 obo , (x obo y). To keep the de nition of obo simple, we specify that the lecturer engages all events on behalf of herself; this does not a ect the system speci cation.
Suppose the professor appoints herself as a checker of the single exam paper. The process of checking an exam paper starts once something has been written. Thus, the write events are the start events for the check paper activity. The professor checks the paper and engages ok or ko to signify whether the paper is acceptable or not. The paper may be released only when the paper as been ok This speci cation implies that if a paper that has been ok'ed is subsequently written to (by write:c), then it is considered re-started, and must be re-checked and ok'ed again before it may successfully conclude.
SEE{Secure Electronic Examinations
In this section we extend the simple examination system described in Examples 1 to 3. This case study serves two purposes: rstly, to illustrate that our template is suitable for organizing the speci cation of CSCW activities, and secondly, it provides a useful collection of activities for which con dentiality requirements will be de ned in the next section.
We assume that there exists a function usr : EVENT ! USER where, given an event x, then usr x de nes the user who may engage that event. For convenience, every event that we will de ne will be of the form u:command, where u represents the user engaging the event. The function usr serves as useful default value for relation obo. This corresponding to the situation when users engage events on behalf of themselves.
Setting exam papers
The SetPaper activity between the chair and lecturer in Example 3 can be generalized to many exam papers and sta . In this case we assume that the cooperation is between the chair of the department and the lecturers. There will be a set paper activity for every exam paper. Thus the SetPaper activity speci cation is parameterized in variable p : PAPER, where PAPER represents the set of all possible exam papers.
At various times the chair decides what papers should be set and by whom. Rather than engage a single announce event for every paper to be set, a chair (user u) engages an event of the form u:announce:P, where P : P PAPER de nes the exam papers to be set. This is an example of a single event acting as the start event for a number of activities. Similarly, given ASSNS = PAPER $ USER the chair engages an event of the form u:appoint-setter:S, where S 2 ASSNS, to appoint the setters for exam papers. The user v : USER is appointed to set paper p : PAPER when the event u:appoint-setter:S, is engaged by the chair u and (v; p) 2 S. Event u:appoint-setter:S is an example of an event that is engaged by the chair u but on behalf of many other users, in this case, joining the SetPaper activity on behalf of the setters. For simplicity we assume there is no cooperation between departments on the setting of exam papers. The activity is speci ed as Activity SetPaper This speci cation permits any user u 2 USER to engage in start events of the form u:announce:P. Section 4.2 will consider how this may be restricted to just those users who are appointed chairs of departments.
The SetPaper activity is terminated by v:release:p:c, where c corresponds to the content of the exam paper. For a successful conclusion the system must ensure that the content of the paper released corresponds to its content when it was last written to. Just one appointed setter writing the paper is a su cient conclusion condition.
Policing membership of activities
Events such as u:announce:P and u:appoint-setter:S are engaged by a chair u to announce and appoint the setters of exam papers. However, we must ensure that any user engaging such an event has actually been appointed a chair. One could achieve this by limiting the events that users can engage, but that would require advance knowledge of what users were chairs, what users where lecturers, etc. This is not realistic. Our approach is to view this responsibility of a chair as a simple activity with just one participant, the chair herself. There is potentially one of these activities for every user, however the activity is initialized only when the user gets appointed as a chair. Thus the speci cation is Activity Chair The new events in do will be introduced in later subsections. An appointment is made on behalf of the chair by some other user (for example the Registrar of the College), for which we assume there is an appropriate activity de ned.
Activity speci cations SetPaper and Chair-Duties are a good example of how integrity and access-control style requirements can be speci ed. Activity speci cation SetPaper de nes a role for lecturers|that of setting papers. Lecturers may take on this role (participate in the activity) only if they are members of the activity. Only users who are appointed chairs have the right to grant membership of activity SetPaper(p) to lecturers.
Checking exam papers
The CheckPaper activity for a particular paper p is between a chair, setters and checkers. The activity is initiated when the exam paper gets written to by a setter. The chair appoints checkers by engaging an event of the form appoint-checker:C (C : ASSNS), which has an interpretation that is similar to appoint-setter above. The activity is terminated when the paper is released and the most recent version of the paper has been ok'ed by every one of the appointed checkers. It is speci ed as Activity CheckPaper 
Taking exam papers
An examination for a particular paper is started by a release event and terminates when the exam is close'ed. An exam is closed with a value A : ANSWRS, where ANSWRS = USER 7! TEXT A gives the nal answers to the paper, by the students participating in the exam. To take the exam, students must join the activity by engaging (register). This may be done before the exam starts or during it. The student may cancel registration (leave) at any time (including, during the actual examination) by engaging a deregister event. In Section 5 we consider how to specify the requirement that no collusion should occur between students during this activity. The TakePaper activity is successfully concluded when it is close'ed with answers for all students who were registered (and did not cancel), and those answers correspond to the nal versions of answers given by the students.
Following the discussion in Section 4.2, activity TakePaper does not control whether a student should be permitted to register for an examination: any student may register. TakePaper deals only with the taking of the exam paper. A further activity should be speci ed which would ensure that students may register for an exam only if they have studied that topic. In turn, a student should be allowed study a topic only if the student has registered in the University. We envisage many more of these`control' activities which are used to control, membership in and initiation of, other activities.
Grading exam papers
Once the examination is nished, the answers may be graded. For simplicity, we have de ned the graders to be the setters of the paper. A grader u assigns a grade g : N to the answers of each student st : USER The GradePaper activity is successfully concluded when the results are published for all those students who sat the paper. This is an example of successful conclusion depending on the starting event of the activity.
The reader should note that we have not considered who should be responsible for close'ing an exam and publish'ing results. A simple solution would be to modify activity Chair-Duties, making the chair responsible for these actions. However, in reality, university examinations are highly bureaucratic, requiring participation in a variety of activities by many di erent users. For reasons of space we cannot consider it here.
5 Con dentiality Properties
The problem
We now investigate how we might specify con dentiality properties for a CSCW system.
In the Secure Electronic Examinations example there are some obvious condentiality requirements:
No examinee should learn any details of the contents of the examination before the start of the examination. No examinee should learn any details of the contents of any other examinees answer paper between the start of the paper and the end of the examination.
No examinee should learn any details of the marking until results are posted.
These requirements are not appropriate for every institution. For example, some have a special paper where the list of essay topics is announced beforehand, while the essay titles themselves are concealed. Some announce details of a candidate's marks to that candidate alone in advance of a general release of overall marks. Group examinations are held in some institutions, but it is generally required that no group plaigerise from any other group.
All of these properties (including the rarer ones immediately above) can be constructed out of a statement of the form:
No information ows from source to sink between start and nish of activity. As in the earlier sections we now construct a speci cation template (giving both a concrete syntax and its semantics) to write down such con dentiality properties. This template is based on (a version) of non-interference expressed in the semantic space associated with Hoare's CSP 10]. Non-interference and variants have been well studied 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 20, 22] since its introduction by Goguen and Meseguer 5, 6].
A simple con dentiality template
Each activity has a given ending point marked by the occurrence of one member of a given set of events: nish. This set is exactly as in the discussion of functionality properties above. We can de ne a predicate over traces of events which describes when an activity has nished. This equation says that (an instance of) an activity has nished at the end of trace t if an event which marks its nish has occurred. Note that` nished t' is weaker than the predicate`Finished' of Section 3.2.
Similarly we de ne a predicate over traces to say if, in the behaviour de ned by the trace, the events in the do set are visible to the non-do. Let \t # s" be \the trace t, but with all events in the set s removed" and T be the set of all traces of the system; then: visible t , t # do 6 2 T This is a variant of the classic non-interference de nition. Now we give a predicate that expresses that no information ows from an activity to the events outside the activity:
Intuitively, if a trace t occurs, before the activity nishes, there must be another trace, equivalent from the external viewpoint, in which the activity has not started. After the activity has nished, any information about it may ow through the system.
A couple of points about this de nition need elucidating. First, it is not necessary to refer to the start of an activity: no relevant information has been entrusted to the system before the start; indeed the do events will be forbidden to occur.
Second, note that this de nition makes the events of the activity which are not do events |join and leave events| part of the \other" world, and so not able to be e ected by the do events, nor able to be hidden from the events outside the activity. The latter is not a restriction; we give an example below to show how to hide the join events of an activity (Example 7). The former is a restriction; but not a serious one in practice: it prevents schemes where who joins and leaves an activity is dependent on the interactions of the activity so far, rather than the whim of a manager. (The start and nish events are ignored above because there can be no do events before a start event, and the presence of a nish event means that no restrictions are applied.) To specify such a strong level of protection we write the keyword Protected in an activity speci cation. Then, for every trace t 2 T , we require that Conf t holds, with do instantiated as the do of the activity. Example 4 It is enough to write Protected activity GradePaper(p:PAPER) is : : : as before: : :
end GradePaper to specify that no action of the activity GradePaper(p) (for a given paper p) may interfere with any events outside the activity, until a publish event.
Note that this does not say that an examination grader cannot use another activity of the system, by suitable coding, to pass information about an examination in which she is involved. But this is just the same as not being able to prevent a grader colluding directly with an examinee outside the scope of the system. Example 4 is rather strong. If we took its analogue for SetPaper, for example, it would prevent any interference with CheckPaper, an unwanted outcome. For the purposes of con dentiality speci cation, we can combine just the necessary elds of existing activities into a new one. The con dentiality properties of TakePaper are most easily described on a per examinee basis. TakePaper above is not described this way, and so we need to extract from a set the events that belong to a given user. For a set of events S and a user u 2 USER we de ne S u to be the projection of S on to the events of user u. Example 6 We can now describe the con dentiality properties for taking a paper as follows. The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.
Discussion
The major con dentiality properties of the SEE example are very simply speci ed. This is perhaps surprising. It comes about partly because so much has been captured by the (simpler to reason about and implement) functionality speci cation, but also because we have been able to modularise the description of the system into activities which are naturally non-interfering. Whether this will hold for domains with less drastic security requirements remains to be seen. We deliberately leave the other elds empty for them to take their default values.
(And we have kept the possible do actions smaller than it is in reality.)
Note how the nish and conclude elds are set to the empty set. This means that the activity can never nish, and the reviewers anonymity is protected for ever. This is unlike activity JoinExaminers (Example 7), where anonymity of examiners is maintained only during the setting of exam papers. Note that if these activities were unprotected then it would still be illegal for users without read access (say) to engage in a read event. However, this is not enough to ensure the con dentiality of the datum in the resource: events of other activities could leak information about its value. Thus, we may view such unprotected access control activities as capable of supporting Bell-LaPadula style MAC requirements, while their protected versions capture non-interference style ow security requirements.
Conlusions
We have presented a notation for describing and specifying CSCW systems where con dentiality is an issue. We believe that |apart from some rough edges noted below| this notation is suitable for use by people who are not trained in formal methods. We believe this for the following reason: The notion of con dentiality used is very simple.
Despite its simplicity it works well for the case study presented here. A danger is that in other applications than SEE it is too simple. Clearly we must try further case studies before de nitely concluding that we have a sophisticated enough notion.
We are reasonably happy with the \outer" form of the language. The concepts to which one must give values are (for the most part) easy to comprehend.
But the notation in which the values are described is still \over-mathematical" for the audience we have in mind. These rough edges must be smoothed over before we can claim to have been more than minimally successful. We can prove the unwinding theorem of Section 5.3 by appealing to a general result on unwinding, expressed in category-theoretic terms, by Jacob 11 ]. Jacob's Theorem 3 and its precursors are expressed very abstractly, and in a somewhat unusual notation. To make use of the theorem each of the abstract concepts needs to be instantiated, and then the formul simpli ed.
A.2 Instantiations
The terms that we need to instantiate are:
A category, S This represents the states of the system. We instantiate this as the possible traces of the system. A trace represents the state of the system after its execution. Of course, several traces may lead to the same state, so we must take care to refer to traces as only as members of an equivalence class. A collection of functors, q a for each object a of S. This represents a statedependent purge function. In our case it is specialised as a collection of functions, indexed by trace. If two traces lead to the same state, then their purges must lead to identical states. The state must hold a record of whether a started activity is nished or not. The purge function depends on this record. If the activity is nished, then the purge function is the identity. A \low users' view arrow" w This represents the projection of the information in a state on to the low users' view. As we only need it in contexts such as: a; w = b; w we will write a b when the states (reached by the traces) a and b are identical to the low user. A further point to note is that the category-theoretic treatment demands some sort of input-totality, a concept which the CSP notion of an event being impossible in a state seems to contradict. However this is not the case: we can treat impossibility of an event as a special kind of null operation on the state, and as it is so we do not even bother to keep it in the trace. This is why it is important, below , to insert a clause forcing events to be possible in both states or neither.
And last, two minor pieces of notation: by \s > f " is meant the application of function f to value s: \f (s)"; by \f ; g" is meant the functional composition of g and f : \g f ".
A.3 Simpli cation
The rst of Jacob's criteria, VS, states that we have to check that low-equivalent states lead to low-equivalent states, for each generator: This translates as: s t ) (s a hei t a hei _ fs a hei; t a heig \ T = fg) Note the clause that legislates an event must be impossible in both states if it is impossible in one.
The second of Jacob's criteria, VC, says that the high actions have no a ect on the low actions: 
B Notation
The mathematical notation used in this paper is based on Z 19] . We avoid using many operators that peculiar to Z; much of the notation can be easily recognized from its set and logic origins.
A set may be de ned in Z using set speci cation in comprehension. This is of the form f D j P E g, where D gives declarations, P a predicate and E an expression. The components of f D j P E g are the values taken by expression E when the variables introduced by D take all possible values that make the predicate P true. For example, the set of squares of all even natural numbers is de ned as f n : N j (n mod2) = 0 n 2 g. When there is only one variable in the declaration and the expression consists of just that variable, then the expression may be dropped if desired. For example, the set of all even numbers may be written as f n : N j (n mod 2) = 0 g. An equivalent way to de ne this set is as f n : N (2 n) g|the predicate may be dropped if it equals true. Sets may also be de ned in display form such as f1; 2g. The last component of non-empty sequence t front t The sequence t with its last component removed # t
The length of sequence t t j A The restriction of sequence t to components in A t # A The sequence t but with components in A removed t _ s The catenation of sequences t and s
